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Abstract 
This paper attempts to provide a probable answer to a longstanding resource curse puzzle; 
i.e., why resource-rich nations grow at a slower rate compared to less fortunate ones. Using an 
innovative threshold estimation technique, the empirical results reveal that there is a threshold 
effect in the natural resources – economic growth relationship. We find that the impact of natural 
resources is meaningful to economic growth only after a certain threshold point of institutional 
quality has been attained. The results also shed light on the fact that the nations that have low 
institutional quality depend heavily on natural resources while countries with high quality 
institutions are relatively less dependent on natural resources to generate growth.   
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1. Introduction 
We suppose natural resource-rich countries to enjoy better economic growth when 
compared to those countries that are less fortunate. Surprisingly, everyday experiences and 
empirical studies show the reverse (Frankel 2010). It seems that abundance of natural resources 
is detrimental to economic growth. This puzzling phenomenon is known as the natural resource 
curse (NRC) hypothesis, and the literature provides at least three theories explaining the NCR: 
Dutch disease models, rent seeking models, and institutional explanation (Sachs and Warner, 
1995 and 2001). Empirical evidence from the last two decades consistently show the prevalence 
of the NRC (Leite and Weidmann (1999), Gylfason (2001), Gylfason and Zoega (2002), among 
others). 
However, recent research − for instance, Brunnschweiler (2008), Brunnschweiler and Bulte 
(2009), and Boyce and Emery (2010) − finds new and contradicting empirical evidence to the 
existing NRC literature. Abundance of natural resources evidently has a positive relationship on 
economic growth as well as economic welfare. Isham et al. (2003) and Frankel (2010) argue that 
the probable reason for inconsistency in the empirical findings by previous researches could be 
the different type of resources, either point or diffuse, and different economic backgrounds in the 
area of level of human capital, level of debt overhang, and export diversification. Brunnschweiler 
(2008) postulates that the inconsistencies in the empirical finding originate from the 
inappropriateness of resource abundance measurement to proxy natural resources in the 
empirical estimation. Using two new variables from the World Bank database, namely the total 
natural capital and subsoil wealth, Brunnschweiler (2008) finds a positive and robust relationship 
between natural resource abundance and economic growth for more than 90 economies. 
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More interestingly, these two outwardly contradicting groups who investigate the NRC 
hypothesis unanimously agree on the importance of good institutions. It is found that economies 
with abundant natural resources and at the same time better institutional quality and governance 
such as strong democratic accountability, high law and order, lower corruption, or higher 
integration among government institutions are evident to have better economic growth and 
higher human welfare (Damania and Bulte, 2003 and Mehlum et al., 2006). This is because 
superior institutional quality could be very effective in nullifying the curse through avoidance of 
rent-seeking behavior (Auty 2001), reducing corruption (Ishan et al. 2005 and Robinson et al. 
2006), lowering the risk of violent civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005), and accelerating 
efficient resource allocation (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003).  
However, previous studies that delve into the institutional quality and resource curse 
hypothesis have imposed an important a priori restriction in their analysis; i.e., the impact of 
natural resource and institutional quality variables is set to be linear and monotonic to economic 
growth. The relationship might be non-linear, and only after a certain level of institution quality 
or any of its interaction terms will natural resources effectively contribute to economic growth. 
In other words, there may be a point only after a certain threshold of institutional quality at 
which the natural resources could have meaningful contribution to the economic growth. 
Therefore, this research affirms a possible answer to the NRC hypothesis puzzle. If natural 
resource abundance is indeed detrimental to economic growth, it might be true only at a low 
quality of institution. As institutional quality improves, the impact of natural resources on 
economic growth may be momentous. If so, policy makers should struggle to archive a high 
level of institutional quality. However, this raises another question: how high should institutional 
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quality be for natural resources to have a favorable effect on economic growth? At what level of 
institutional quality is the curse annulled? 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between natural resources and 
economic growth by considering the threshold level of institutional quality using the 
Brunnweiller (2008) dataset. Specifically, the questions addressed in this paper are as follows. 
(1) Why are the empirical findings on the issues of NRC hypothesis far from conclusive? This 
research offers analysis that favors the importance of high institutional quality and good 
governance that could provide an answer to the NRC puzzle. (2) Are different levels of 
institutional quality inherent in the economy contributors to the NRC effect? This study attempts 
to answer this second question by offering a threshold level at which the effect of natural 
resources on economic growth is positive or otherwise. In other words, is there any threshold 
level of institutional quality above which natural resources affect economic growth rate 
differently? This paper employs relatively new econometric methods for threshold estimation 
and inference, as proposed by Hansen (1996 and 2000).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss the 
theory and recent evidence of the NCR hypothesis and institutions. Section 3 describes the 
dataset used in the empirical analysis and the layout of the econometric procedures. Section 4 
discusses the estimation results, and finally, Section 5 offers concluding remarks.    
 
2. Institutions and natural resource curse hypothesis 
 
Economists generally agree that poor or good results from any growth policies are largely 
dependent on the level of institutional quality inherent in the economy and not natural resource 
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abundance (Barro 1991 and North 1994). Regardless of how good the policy is or how many 
resources they have, if the institutions − either public or private − are not accommodating, then 
the desired results from such good resource policy will shatter. Nelson and Sampat (2001) 
technically define institutions as ‘social technologies’ that are positively related to economic 
performance.  They postulate that, when institutions are of low quality, due to frequent changes 
of rules, high levels of corruption, widespread nepotism, and weak law enforcement, the markets 
will not function well and may lead to high market volatility, and then the efficient allocation of 
resources may be severely affected. In contrast, high-quality market characteristics play an 
important role in promoting an efficient and low-risk investment opportunity that could be vital 
to providing a better environment for sustainable economic growth.  
Rodrik et al. (2004) argue that a low-quality institution through which natural resources is 
channeled to an economic activity could aggravate information asymmetries and adversely affect 
resource allocation efficiency if used by the perverse politician. Then the decision made by the 
authority might be politically rational but economically inefficient. On the other hand, high-
quality institutions could provide an efficient mean for channeling information about market 
conditions and participants by facilitating mutual cooperation between market actors that could 
eventually reduce transaction costs and increase efficiency. Therefore, institutions could act as a 
tool that reverses the negative association between natural resource wealth and poor outcomes. 
Good institutional arrangement is also crucial to the management of optimal and efficient 
resources
2
. 
                                                          
2
 Leite and Weidmann (2002) explain that the negative associations among institutions, resource abundance, and 
economic growth are insufficient in establishing the direction of causality. Questions regarding the cause and the 
effect still remain unresolved. However, these researchers are in the position to argue that poor institutions are a 
result of resource abundance rather than the cause. 
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Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) explain that the high-quality institution is one that is 
producer friendly and not grabber friendly. In a similar argument, they divide institutions into 
two categories. The first group includes the institutions that are grabber friendly and the second 
group include those that are producer friendly. These researchers conjecture that the curse is only 
effective under a grabber-friendly institution and not for the latter. If the institution is producer 
friendly, then resource-rich countries are hypothesized to attract more producers to involve in 
production and then eventually increase growth; this is not the case for grabber-friendly 
institutions. Upon empirically testing the hypothesis for 87 countries, the result favors the idea 
that producer-friendly institutions could reduce significantly the effect of the resource curse. 
They find that countries like the U.S., Canada, Norway, and Australia are curse-free and enjoy 
high economic growth due to their producer-friendly institutions with exceptionally high quality 
(Larsen 2005). However, their study does not clearly differentiate between good qualities that are 
associated with the producer-friendly institutions in contrast to the grabber-friendly ones.    
  
3. Empirical model  
 
The empirical model is based on Brunnschweiler (2008), in which the empirical linkages 
between natural resources and growth use the following linear cross-country growth equation: 
 
iiii XINSRRGDPC   3210                 (1) 
where RGDPCi is the real GDP per capita in country i, Ri is the country’s natural resource 
abundance, INS is institutional quality, X is a vector of controls (initial income per capita, 
latitude), and i is a noise term. Since we use logs, the effect of natural resources on real GDP 
per capita is expressed as elasticity. 
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To test the hypothesis outlined in the previous section, we argue that the following 
Equation (2) is particularly well suited to capture the presence of contingency effects and to offer 
a a rich way of modeling the influence of institutional quality on the impact of natural resources 
in economic growth. The model, based on threshold regression, takes the following form: 
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where INS (i.e., level of institutional development) is the threshold variable used to split the 
sample into regimes or groups, and  is the unknown threshold parameter. This type of modeling 
strategy allows the role of natural resources to differ depending on whether institutions are below 
or above some unknown level of . In this equation, institutions act as sample-splitting (or 
threshold) variables. The impact of natural resources on real GDP per capita will be 
1
1
 
and 
2
1 for countries with a low or high regime, respectively. It is obvious that, under the 
hypothesis
21   , the model becomes linear and reduces to (1).  
The first step of our estimation is to test the null hypothesis of linearity 210 :  H   
against the threshold model in Equation (2). We follow Hansen (1996, 2000), who suggests a 
heteroskedasticity-consistent Lagrange Multiplier (LM) bootstrap procedure to test the null 
hypothesis of a linear formulation against a threshold regression alternative. Since the threshold 
parameter  is not identified under the null hypothesis of the no-threshold effect, the p values are 
computed by a fixed bootstrap method. Hansen (2000) shows that this procedure yields 
asymptotically correct p values. It is important to note that, if the hypothesis of 
21   is 
rejected and a threshold level is identified, we should test again the threshold regression model 
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against a linear specification after dividing the original sample according to the threshold thus 
identified. This procedure is carried out until the null of 
21  
 
can no longer be rejected. 
Even though natural resources may have a positive effect on growth, the results may have 
been driven by resource-rich countries with high institutional quality. In order to examine this 
possibility, Equation (2) is extended as follows to include an interaction term between 
institutions and natural resources: 
     
iiii XINSRINSRRGDPC   4i3210   ) x (             (3) 
If 3 is negative and statistically significant, this implies that the negative growth effect increases 
as institutional quality improves. On the other hand, if 3 is positive and significant, this 
indicates that the negative growth effect diminishes as institutional quality improves. Equation 
(3) is estimated using the threshold regression technique.    
 
4. The data 
 
This study employs cross-country estimations in order to estimate Equation (2). The 
number of countries is 90, and the sample period spans from 1984 to 2005.  
Following Brunnschweiler (2008), three natural resource indicators are employed in the 
analysis, namely (i) primary exports over GDP (sxp); (ii) average total natural capital (natcap) − 
this measure includes subsoil assets, timber resources, non-timber forest recourses, protected 
areas, cropland, and pastureland; and (iii) average subsoil assets (subsoil) − this measure 
includes energy resources and other mineral resources. The sxp dataset is obtained from Sachs 
and Warner (1995), whereas the natcap and subsoil dataset are gathered from World Bank.     
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The institutions dataset employed is from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), a 
monthly publication of Political Risk Services (PRS). In this study, four PRS indicators were 
used to measure the overall institutional environment: (i) corruption, which measures excessive 
patronage, nepotism, job reservation, ‘favour-for-favours,’ secret-party funding, and suspicious 
ties between politics and business. It is hypothesised that a high level of corruption distorts the 
economic and financial environment and reduces the efficiency of the government and 
businesses by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than 
ability. The index ranges between zero and six; the higher the corruption, the lower the index; (ii) 
rule of law, which reveals the degree to which citizens are willing to accept established 
institutions to make and implement laws and to adjudicate disputes; (iii) bureaucratic quality, 
which represents autonomy from political pressure, strength, and expertise to govern without 
drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services, as well as the existence of an 
established mechanism for recruitment and training of bureaucrats; and (iv) government 
effectiveness, which measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and 
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. These four 
variables were scaled from 0 to 6, where higher values implied better institutional quality and 
vice versa.  
The real GDP per capita is expressed in USD at constant 2000 prices, and latitude is the 
location of the country. All dataset are obtained from World Development Indicators.  
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5. Results 
 
Equation (2) has been estimated using four different models depending on the institution 
indicator used (Model A: Rule of Law; Model B: Government Effect; Model C: Corruption; and 
Model D: Buraucratic Quality). Employing splitting sample threshold method from Hansen 
(1996 and 2000) to investigate the NRC hypothesis with three different measures of natural 
resources, namely the share of resources export to GDP (sxp) as in Sachs and Warner (1995), 
total natural capital (natcap) and subsoil wealth (subsoil) as used by Brunnschweiler (2008). The 
results of each model are presented in Tables 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b, and 2c. The letters a, b, and c 
after number 1 or 2 refer to an estimation using the share of natural resource export to GDP 
(sxp), total natural capital (natcap) and subsoil wealth (subsoil), respectively. The number 2 
refers to the estimation of Equation (3) with an interaction of natural resources and institutional 
quality while number 1 is without an interaction term.  
This study has revealed several interesting results. First, the result shows (as shown in 
Tables 1a, 1b, and 1c or 2a, 2b, and 2c) that the p-value of the hypothesis of the no threshold 
effect as computed by a bootstrap method with 1,000 replications and 15% trimming percentage 
are rejected at a very highly significant level with and without the interaction term irrespective of 
the models. The finding clearly indicates that the relationship between economic growth and 
natural resources are non-linear, and therefore the imposition of a priori monotonic restriction on 
the relationship also can be very misleading. The finding provides a better explanation for a 
dynamic rich relationship between natural resources and economic growth. Natural resources can 
effectively contribute to economic growth only after a certain level of institution quality or any 
of its interaction terms.   
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Second, the presence of threshold level also indicates that the sample can be split into two 
different groups depending on the level of institutional quality. Any country that has an 
institutional quality less than the threshold level is considered a low-quality institution, while one 
with quality greater than the threshold values is classified as a high-quality institution. The 
behavior of the relationships between natural resources and economic growth are different for 
low- and high-quality institutions. For instance, Table 1c depicts that the hypothesis of NRC is 
rejected at a lower level of institutional quality for Models A, B, C, and D. The coefficients of 
the subsoil variable for these models are 0.532, 0.505, 0.520, and 0.549, respectively, and 
significant at the 5 percent level at least. However, as institutions get better (above the threshold 
level) the contribution of natural resources is negligible. Another example is found in Table 2a 
where, at a lower level of government effect (< 0.47), the coefficient of 
1
1 is -34.1, while at a 
higher level (>0.47) of government integrity, the results dramatically change to only -9.47. 
In addition, the regression’s result from Equation 3 has provided new insight into the 
understanding of the resource curse. For instance, Table 2a Model B shows that the global as 
well as the threshold regression coefficient for natural resources is negative, thus confirming the 
NRC hypothesis. However, interestingly, the interaction term between natural resources and 
institutional quality from the regression is positive and significant. The negative coefficient of 
natural resources and then followed by a positive coefficient of interaction term is a sign of the 
NRC getting weaker as the government effect gets stronger. If the government effect reached 
1.342 level, than it will cancel out the effect of the resource curse. Out of 90 countries, our 
sample shows that 64 countries have the sufficient institutional quality to insulate the economy 
from the resource curse.     
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6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we re-examine the well-known empirical puzzle of the resource curse 
hypothesis using a threshold regression with reference to different institutional quality. In 
particular, we endogenously determine the threshold level of institutional quality and then use 
this threshold point to test the different effects of natural resources on economic growth at low-
institutional quality in comparison to natural resources within high-institutional quality countries.  
There are several major findings in this paper. First, a priori monotonic restriction on the 
study of NRC could lead to a premature conclusion. In this study, we consistently fail to reject 
the presence of the threshold effect in the estimation regardless of models. Furthermore, the 
study highlights the importance of good quality of institution to neutralize the effect of the 
natural resource curse. Resource policy will be effective only under a good institution. 
Abundance resource countries but with weak institutional quality will not be better off in 
economic growth if compared to the poor resource economies. Further, this study also shows that 
high quality institution nation is less dependent on the natural resources to generate economic 
growth.  
In summary, a nation desiring to benefit fully from its natural resources should not neglect 
the important role of good institutions for a sustainable economic growth, and with good 
institutions, the NCR puzzle can also be challenged.  
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TABLE 1a: Threshold estimates of equation 


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
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iiii
iiii
i
eXINSR
eXINSR
RGDPC   using share of resources export to GDP (sxp) 
 Model A 
Institutions: Rule of Law 
Model B 
Institutions: Government Effect 
Model C 
Institutions: Corruption 
Model D 
Institutions: Bureaucratic Quality 
 Linear <0.54 >0.54 Linear <0.17 >0.17 Linear <3.28 >3.28 Linear <0.69 >0.69 
Constant 11.389** 
(2.037) 
8.955** 
(2.128) 
26.8** 
(2.78) 
 10.42** 
(2.00) 
 6.118** 
(2.46) 
 
18.9** 
(1.83) 
5.221** 
(1.766) 
4.617* 
(2.02) 
-2.37 
(7.234) 
9.573** 
(0.767) 
4.431** 
(1.138) 
5.673** 
(1.439) 
RGDP1970 -0.764 
(0.295) 
-0.339 
(0.302) 
-2.85 
(0.402) 
 -0.651** 
(0.292) 
0.010 
(0.344) 
-1.77 
(0.27) 
0.048 
(0.282) 
0.086 
(0.311) 
1.309 
(1.040) 
-0.241 
(0.099) 
-0.266 
(0.101) 
0.143 
(0.159) 
Sxp -5.637 
(2.403) 
-8.951 
(2.083) 
-2.73 
(1.42) 
5.178* 
(2.386) 
-7.92 
(2.279) 
-0.811 
(1.780) 
-6.113 
(3.07) 
-9.223 
(2.541) 
3.008 
(5.120) 
-0.871 
(0.094) 
-0.555 
(0.116) 
-1.206 
(0.248) 
Rule of Law 1.442 
(1.275) 
1.735** 
(0.452) 
1.42** 
(0.368) 
         
Government 
Effectiveness  
   1.297** 
(0.311) 
1.204 
(0.646) 
1.220** 
(0.266) 
      
Corruption       0.110 
(0.223) 
0.257 
(0.221) 
-0.337 
(0.656) 
   
Bureaucratic 
Quality  
         -0.810 
(0.115) 
7.498** 
(1.609) 
-0.086 
(0.129) 
Latitude -0.829 
(1.275) 
0.557 
(2.006) 
0.97 
(0.996) 
-0.347 
(1.205) 
1.265 
(1.948) 
0.260 
(0.874) 
1.586 
(1.845) 
3.875* 
(1.687) 
-1.209 
(3.814) 
-0.445 
(0.103) 
0.223 
(0.128) 
-0.667 
(0.097) 
Boot (p-value) 
 
0.000   0.000   0.483   0.000   
R-sq 
 
0.367 0.396 0.638 0.343   0.196 0.348 0.080 0.572 0.868 0.748 
Het(p-value) 
 
0.089   0.035   0.015   0.011   
No. Obs 
 
90 60 30 90 52  90 60 30 90 39 51 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses (White corrected for heteroskedasticity). Results correspond to trimming percentage of 15%. *** and 
** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 1b: Threshold regression estimates of equation 
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RGDPC   using total natural resource (natcap).  
 Model A 
Institutions: Rule of Law 
Model B 
Institutions: Government Effect 
Model C 
Institutions: Corruption 
Model D 
Institutions: Bureaucratic Quality 
 Linear <0.45 >0.45 Linear <0.48 >0.48 Linear <1.6 >1.6 Linear <1.95 >1.95 
Constant 10.89** 
(2.45) 
5.929** 
(1.920) 
24.69** 
(3.37) 
10.513** 
(2.567) 
6.064** 
(2.23) 
20.524** 
(3.465) 
3.596 
(1.899) 
-5.772 
(5.453) 
3.833* 
(1.926) 
6.761** 
(1.204) 
7.352** 
(1.23) 
-50.622 
(9.31) 
RGDP1970 -1.314 
(0.383) 
-1.656 
(0.471) 
-2.327 
(0.468) 
-1.216 
(0.395) 
-1.585 
(0.451) 
-1.714 
(0.469) 
-0.342 
(0.425) 
4.080** 
(0.812) 
-0.403 
(0.379) 
0.327** 
(0.089) 
0.298** 
(0.091) 
0.591** 
(0.222) 
Natcap 0.383 
(0.243) 
1.267** 
(0.344) 
-0.243 
(0.130) 
0.337 
(0.254) 
1.146** 
(0.335) 
-0.159 
(0.146) 
0.424 
(0.255) 
-1.612 
(0.654) 
0.445 
(0.237) 
-0.646 
(0.086) 
-0.670 
(0.090) 
-0.559 
(0.117) 
Rule of Law 1.562** 
(0.372) 
2.446** 
(0.458) 
0.932** 
(0.342) 
         
Government 
Effectiveness  
   1.521** 
(0.423) 
2.304** 
(0.626) 
0.351 
(0.397 
      
Corruption       -0.208 
(0.274) 
4.078** 
(0.858) 
-0.254 
(0.311) 
   
Bureaucratic 
Quality  
         0.067 
(0.278) 
0.272 
(0.345) 
25.40** 
(4.69) 
Latitude 0.370 
(1.638) 
2.004 
(2.165) 
2.37 
(1.451) 
0.522 
(1.575) 
2.91 
(2.016) 
1.287 
(1.130) 
5.058** 
(1.701)  
-18.853 
(4.652) 
5.541** 
(1.873)  
-0.115 
(0.120) 
-0.173 
(0.125) 
0.603** 
(0.238) 
Boot (p-value) 
 
0.000   0.000   0.070   0.606   
R-sq 
 
0.315 0.398 0.614 0.301 0.361 0.615 0.170 0.819 0.212 0.453 0.457 0.880 
Het(p-value) 
 
0.395   0.381   0.280   0.001   
No. Obs 
 
77 51 26 77 51 26 77 9 68 77 68 9 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses (White corrected for heteroskedasticity). Results correspond to trimming percentage of 15%. *** and 
** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 1c: Threshold estimates of equation 












INS
INS
   
,
,
2
3
2
2
2
1
2
0
1
3
1
2
1
1
1
0
iiii
iiii
i
eXINSR
eXINSR
RGDPC   using subsoil wealth (subsoil) 
 Model A 
Institutions: Rule of Law 
Model B 
Institutions: Government Effect 
Model C 
Institutions: Corruption 
Model D 
Institutions: Bureaucratic Quality 
 Linear <0.45 >0.45 Linear <0.4 >0.4 Linear <4.1 >4.1 Linear <2.69 >2.69 
Constant 16.4** 
(2.206) 
16.6** 
(2.12) 
23.6** 
(2.63) 
13.509** 
(2.198) 
17.586** 
(2.035) 
19.07** 
(3.34) 
11.055** 
(1.951) 
13.342** 
(2.099) 
18.756** 
(2.39) 
11.76** 
(1.58) 
11.36** 
(2.28) 
10.26** 
(1.89) 
RGDP1970 -1.97 
(0.324) 
-2.185 
(0.316) 
-2.31 
(0.37) 
-1.981 
(0.327) 
-2.286 
(0.261) 
-1.64 
(0.469) 
-1.422 
(0.374) 
-2.053 
(0.374) 
-1.402 
(0.343) 
-1.58 
(0.303) 
-1.707 
(0.401) 
-0.596 
(0.300) 
Subsoil 0.363** 
(0.072) 
0.532** 
(0.083) 
0.023 
(0.046) 
0.341** 
(0.068) 
0.505** 
(0.075) 
-0.004 
(0.051) 
0.375** 
(0.090) 
0.520** 
(0.094) 
0.115 
(0.146) 
0.358** 
(0.077) 
0.549** 
(0.072) 
0.091 
(0.065) 
Rule of Law 1.58** 
(0.331) 
1.417** 
(0.452) 
0.461 
(0.362) 
         
Government 
Effectiveness  
   1.703** 
(0.378) 
2.020** 
(0.579) 
0.106 
(0.298) 
      
Corruption       0.262 
(0.243) 
0.561* 
(0.245) 
-0.562 
(0.275) 
   
Bureaucratic 
Quality  
         0.653* 
(0.284) 
0.258 
(0.379) 
-0.247 
(0.325) 
Latitude 1.771 
(1.337) 
2.273 
(1.763) 
1.422 
(0.961) 
1.685 
(1.263) 
1.772 
(1.832) 
1.141 
(1.022) 
5.619** 
(1.545) 
7.178** 
(1.703) 
2.233* 
(1.020) 
5.023** 
(1.409) 
8.61** 
(2.13) 
2.402* 
(1.080) 
Boot (p-value) 
 
0.000   0.000   0.001   0.004   
R-sq 
 
0.497 0.578 0.792 0.524 0.634 0.663 0.366 0.481 0.645 0.423 0.519 0.188 
Het(p-value) 
 
0.887   0.817   0.676   0.557   
No. Obs 
 
60 39 21 60 37 23 60 44 16 60 37 23 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses (White corrected for heteroskedasticity). Results correspond to trimming percentage of 15%. *** and 
** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2a: OLS and threshold regression estimates of equation iiii XINSRINSRRGDPC   4i3210   ) x (  using share of resources to 
export (sxp)  
 Model A 
Institutions: Rule of Law 
Model B 
Institutions: Government Effect 
Model C 
Institutions: Corruption 
Model D 
Institutions: Bureaucratic Quality 
 Linear <0.09 >0.09 Linear <0.47 >0.47 Linear <3.29 >3.29 Linear <2.08 >2.08 
Constant 10.77** 
(2.00) 
9.74** 
(2.83) 
16.4** 
(2.06) 
9.71** 
(2.02) 
5.75 
(3.84) 
13.9** 
(2.27) 
5.46** 
(1.819) 
3.899* 
(1.936) 
-4.300 
(7.65) 
0.699 
(0.587) 
0.757 
(1.065) 
-2.02 
(1.29) 
RGDP1970 -0.630 
(0.289) 
-0.396 
(0.379) 
-1.434 
(0.293) 
-0.504 
(0.296) 
0.006 
(0.57) 
-1.001 
(0.307) 
0.139 
(0.305) 
-0.053 
(0.320) 
1.34 
(0.99) 
0.695** 
(0.054) 
0.670** 
(0.175) 
0.672 
(0.805) 
sxp -6.454 
(1.943) 
-16.72 
(3.438) 
-0.972 
(4.130) 
-5.895 
(1.725) 
-34.1 
(17.86) 
-9.479 
(2.355) 
-13.25 
(6.29) 
6.809 
(13.69) 
16.806 
(18.51) 
-0.001 
(0.037) 
-2.334 
(1.404) 
-0.026 
(0.106) 
Rule of Law 0.964** 
(0.347) 
3.506** 
(1.031) 
1.277** 
(0.298) 
         
Government 
Effectiveness  
   0.786* 
(0.350) 
2.40 
(2.97) 
0.613* 
(0.274) 
      
Corruption       -0.135 
(0.27) 
0.886 
(0.638) 
-0.009 
(0.549) 
   
Bureaucratic 
Quality  
         -0.023 
(0.067) 
0.524 
(0.560) 
-0.154 
(0.283) 
Latitude -1.331 
(1.298) 
2.650 
(2.484) 
-1.004 
(1.130) 
-0.815 
(1.235) 
3.46 
(2.88) 
-1.164 
(1.097) 
1.301 
(1.914) 
4.013** 
(1.588) 
-0.834 
(4.098) 
-0.119 
(0.090) 
-0.126 
(0.092) 
-1.719 
(2.418) 
Interaction 4.511* 
(1.993) 
-17.78 
(2.484) 
0.652 
(3.010) 
4.685** 
(1.825) 
-41.92 
(26.80) 
7.062** 
(1.882) 
2.284 
(1.761) 
-6.289 
(5.149) 
-3.14 
(3.62) 
-0.178 
(0.080) 
-0.091 
(0.171) 
-0.264 
(0.030) 
Boot (p-value) 
 
0.018   0.017   0.395   0.198   
R-sq 
 
0.403 0.329 0.462 0.382 0.317 0.403 0.208 0.368 0.102 0.865 0.808 0.961 
Het(p-value) 
 
0.018   0.093   0.052   0.193   
No. Obs 
 
90 46 44 90 26 64 90 60 30 90 35 55 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses (White corrected for heteroskedasticity). Results correspond to trimming percentage of 15%. *** and 
** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2b: OLS and threshold regression estimates of equation iiii XINSRINSRRGDPC   4i3210   ) x (  using total natural resource 
(natcap).  
 Model A 
Institutions: Rule of Law 
Model B 
Institutions: Government Effect 
Model C 
Institutions: Corruption 
Model D 
Institutions: Bureaucratic Quality 
 Linear <0.75 >0.75 Linear <0.47 >0.47 Linear <1.6 >1.6 Linear <0.75 >0.75 
Constant 9.39** 
(1.91) 
62.3 
(51.0) 
7.85** 
(1.87) 
9.179** 
(2.05) 
52.15** 
(10.62) 
7.038* 
(3.26) 
-0.665 
(4.25) 
-9.92 
(6.57) 
-5.17 
(4.39) 
9.391** 
(1.913) 
62.35 
(51.01) 
4.008 
(42.32) 
RGDP1970 -1.75 
(0.401) 
-2.59 
(0.51) 
-1.601 
(0.410) 
-1.568 
(0.383) 
-1.071 
(0.771) 
-1.671 
(0.331) 
-0.351 
(0.449) 
4.564** 
(1.043) 
-0.59 
(0.441) 
-1.75 
(0.401) 
-2.592 
(0.513) 
-2.96** 
(-0.735) 
natcap 0.923** 
(0.282) 
-3.92 
(5.81) 
0.959** 
(0.284) 
0.784** 
(0.264) 
-5.212 
(1.374) 
1.151** 
(0.393) 
0.946 
(0.688) 
-1.411 
(0.644) 
1.609* 
(0.699) 
0.923** 
(0.282) 
-3.937 
(5.819) 
-2.896 
(1.701) 
Rule of Law 8.361** 
(1.55) 
60.2 
(48.1) 
7.929** 
(1.668) 
         
Government 
Effectiveness  
   7.875** 
(1.541) 
59.52** 
(12.96) 
7.869** 
(1.891) 
      
Corruption       1.014 
(1.362) 
10.82 
(9.06) 
2.514 
(1.48) 
   
Bureaucratic 
Quality  
         8.361** 
(1.550) 
60.266 
(48.101) 
-12.67 
(11.89) 
Latitude 1.145 
(1.508) 
-21.7 
(3.84) 
2.599 
(1.449) 
1.318 
(1.493) 
0.091 
(3.422) 
2.977 
(1.438) 
5.611** 
(1.772) 
-21.513 
(6.33) 
6.153** 
(1.857) 
1.145 
(1.508) 
-21.74 
(3.84) 
-0.63 
(5.508) 
Interaction -0.758 
(0.162) 
-6.32 
(5.66) 
-0.759 
(0.169) 
-0.711 
(0.157) 
-7.392 
(1.574) 
-0.797 
(0.219) 
-0.149 
(0.145) 
-8.801 
(1.086) 
-0.309 
(0.150) 
-0.758 
(0.162) 
-6.324 
(5.662) 
-1.167 
(1.507) 
Boot (p-value) 
 
0.150   0.045   0.102   0.138   
R-sq 
 
0.437 0.895 0.411 0.400 0.389 0.392 0.182 0.826 0.241 0.437 0.895 0.411 
Het(p-value) 
 
0.576   0.523   0.28   0.576   
No. Obs 
 
77 10 67 77 21 56 77 9 68 77 10 67 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses (White corrected for heteroskedasticity). Results correspond to trimming percentage of 15%. *** and 
** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2c: OLS and threshold regression estimates of equation iiii XINSRINSRRGDPC   4i3210   ) x (  using subsoil wealth (subsoil) 
 Model A 
Institutions: Rule of Law 
Model B 
Institutions: Government Effect 
Model C 
Institutions: Corruption 
Model D 
Institutions: Bureaucratic Quality 
 Linear <0.45 >0.45 Linear <0.42 >0.42 Linear <3.08 >3.08 Linear <0.97 >0.97 
Constant 16.905** 
(2.04) 
16.67** 
(2.02) 
26.49** 
(1.905) 
17.17** 
(2.03) 
17.5** 
(1.96) 
24.4** 
(2.14) 
9.659** 
(1.99) 
14.59** 
(2.58) 
-1.257 
(3.198) 
9.927** 
(1.706) 
15.5** 
(4.84) 
8.59** 
(2.17) 
RGDP1970 -2.012 
(0.289) 
-2.355 
(0.356) 
-2.323 
(0.307) 
-2.051 
(0.282) 
-2.35 
(0.274) 
-1.819 
(0.344) 
-1.424 
(0.347) 
-2.231 
(0.435) 
-0.402 
(0.380) 
-1.505 
(0.294) 
-2.664 
(0.862) 
-1.171 
(0.322) 
subsoil 0.357** 
(0.069) 
0.705** 
(0.126) 
-0.423 
(0.135) 
0.340** 
(0.064) 
0.600** 
(0.09) 
-0.671 
(0.201) 
0.630** 
(0.112) 
0.517** 
(0.111) 
2.017** 
(0.569) 
0.622** 
(0.112) 
1.953** 
(0.534) 
0.681* 
(0.300) 
Rule of Law 2.899** 
(0.438) 
-0.092 
(1.133) 
-0.909 
(0.456) 
         
Government 
Effectiveness  
   3.153** 
(0.504) 
1.193 
(0.885) 
-1.947 
(0.674) 
      
Corruption       0.746** 
(0.292) 
0.596 
(0.357) 
1.272 
(0.660) 
   
Bureaucratic 
Quality  
         1.232** 
(0.312) 
5.219 
(2.746) 
0.948 
(0.854) 
Latitude 1.515 
(1.17) 
2.337 
(1.669) 
0.575 
(0.971) 
1.431 
(1.218) 
1.619 
(1.720) 
0.076 
(0.948) 
6.04** 
(1.61) 
6.65** 
(2.214) 
5.93** 
(1.38) 
5.404** 
(1.396) 
2.968 
(3.443) 
5.362** 
(1.374) 
Interaction 
 
-0.194 
(0.050) 
0.256 
(0.164) 
0.252** 
(0.074) 
-0.208 
(0.047) 
0.148 
(0.112) 
0.392** 
(0.108) 
-0.088 
(0.033) 
-0.012 
(0.062) 
-0.359 
(0.104) 
-0.119 
(0.042) 
-2.366 
(0.850) 
-0.148 
(0.094) 
Boot (p-value) 
 
0.050   0.017   0.003   0.039   
R-sq 
 
0.569 0.594 0.829 0.601 0.652 0.755 0.397 0.454 0.610 0.453 0.72 0.336 
Het(p-value) 
 
0.725   0.529   0.860   0.59   
No. Obs 
 
60 39 21 60 38 22 60 36 24 60 10 50 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses (White corrected for heteroskedasticity). Results correspond to trimming percentage of 15%. *** and 
** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
